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ARTICLE




Is free exercise of religion a fundamental right or simply a nuisance?
The fact of the matter is that it is both. Indeed, all of the fundamental rights,
including the freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the
press, right to counsel, right to a jury trial, and privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, are nuisances in the sense that they require resources and
interfere with the efficiency of government. These fundamental rights im-
pede societal goals and require us to confront complications that we would
often prefer to avoid. Moreover, the current climate of increasingly hostile
and superficial public discourse has underscored the difficulties in resolving
questions involving the protection of fundamental rights, including the col-
lision of religious liberty and important competing values.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution begins with,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 The significance of this provision is
exceptionally clear.2 It was not buried deep in the Constitution where it
would be difficult to find. This dual protection of religious liberty is the
very first provision in the Bill of Rights3—the very first guarantee enumer-
ated in the very first amendment made to the Constitution.
* Justice Robert H. Jackson Distinguished Professor of Law, Albany Law School; Ph.D.,
M.A.P.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; B.S., Union College. Blog: New
York Court Watcher. This article was adapted from several presentations delivered to academic
and bar groups. The author is grateful to Albany Law School student Eric O’Bryan who helped
transform the transcript of one such presentation into article form, and to Kayla M. Kienzle,
Andrew Hanson, and other members of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for their fine
editorial work.
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Thomas Jefferson and James Madison are widely credited with devel-
oping the foundation for First Amendment religious freedom.4 Thomas Jef-
ferson, while Governor of the State of Virginia, drafted the Bill for the
Establishment of Religious Freedom in 1777.5 Jefferson’s bill was passed
into law several years later largely through the efforts of James Madison
who navigated it through the state legislature, turning Bill No. 82 into the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.6 This statute expressed Jefferson’s
belief that there should be a separation of church and state to allow each
man the freedom to choose his religious beliefs.7 The Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedoms stated that “no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship whatsoever, nor be enforced, restrained, mo-
lested or burdened, nor otherwise suffer on accounts of his religious opin-
ions or beliefs.”8 Under this statute, Virginia no longer required the support
of the Anglican Church, nor restricted the practice of other religions.9
James Madison, in addition to drafting the Bill of Rights, Constitution, and
many of the Federalist Papers, authored the Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments in 1785 to further support the concept of
religious liberty set forth by Jefferson in the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom.10 This support is evident in the document’s language: “[i]t is the
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as
he believes to be acceptable to him.”11 The “duty is precedent, both in order
of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”12
The work of the founders, especially Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, has helped save this country from much of the religious strife that
most of mankind has confronted. Without their efforts in Virginia, our
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–164 (1878); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947); see also Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James
Madison and the First Amendment, 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 427, 427 (1983). See generally THOMAS
J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND THE STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
5. Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monti
cello.org/site/research-and-collections/virginia-statute-religious-freedom (last visited Apr. 9,
2018).
6. Id. Jefferson considered the Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom to be
one of his proudest accomplishments and one of a list of only three for which he wanted to be
remembered. His self-written epitaph, engraved on his tombstone at Monticello, Virginia, identi-
fies him as the author of that statute, author of the Declaration of Independence, and the Father of
the University of Virginia. DUMAS MALONE, THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 499 (1981).
7. Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, VA. MUSEUM OF HIST.
& CULTURE, http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/tho
mas-jefferson (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, U. CHI.
PRESS (2000), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2018).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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newly-formed country might well have perpetuated the cycle of religious
tribalism and violence that has characterized much of the history of man-
kind.13 They saved us from the continuous religious wars that had plagued
the previous generations.14
This was not a feat that could be accomplished by only one of the
founding fathers, regardless of how extraordinary he was. Thomas Jefferson
was a scientist, an inventor, a philosopher, an architect, and a statesman, but
he needed James Madison to ultimately maneuver Jefferson’s bill through
the political landscape of Virginia.15 In fact, despite being governor,
Thomas Jefferson could not get his bill passed. It became law, the Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom, only when James Madison was governor.16
Nevertheless, the statute was one of the accomplishments of which
Jefferson was most proud. On his gravestone in Monticello, Virginia, his
self-authored epitaph reads, “Here was buried, Thomas Jefferson, author of
the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for
Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia.”17 Notably, he
did not include being President on his gravestone, but apparently viewed his
authorship of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom to be more sig-
nificant.18 This was, for him, one of the crowning achievements of his
life.19
Additionally, including the University of Virginia, of which he was the
founder—and architect—truly reflects Thomas Jefferson’s view of educa-
tion as unencumbered by religious mandates or preferences. Instead, he be-
lieved it essential to free government that citizens be educated to pursue
truth wherever it might take them—in religion as well as all other endeav-
ors.20 That was among the reasons for which he espoused a strict wall of
separation between church and state. Indeed, having established the Univer-
sity of Virginia as a state institution—which it continues to be—Jefferson
ensured that it would be separate from any particular religion.21
13. See, e.g., Thirty Years’ War, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/thirty-years-
war (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
14. See, e.g., id.
15. JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THOMAS JEFFERSON: PHILOSOPHER AND POLITICIAN 7 (2005); Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom, supra note 5.
16. See id.
17. Jefferson’s Gravestone, THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site/
research-and-collections/jeffersons-gravestone (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Our Endless Pursuit, U. OF VA., http://www.virginia.edu/overview (last visited Apr.
9, 2018).
21. See id.; Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, supra note 5.
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III. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.22 The
language of the clause prevents us and, more importantly jurists, from ap-
plying it literally.23 The literal application of the Free Exercise Clause
would allow the most egregious and otherwise harmful behaviors to be
treated as constitutionally protected religious practices.24 For example, gov-
ernment would be prohibited from enacting legislation that prohibited
human sacrifices, which have been part of many religious practices
throughout human history.25 Unless such religious practices, as well as
others that pose serious dangers to public health and safety, are to be al-
lowed, the Free Exercise Clause cannot be applied literally. Civilized soci-
ety must be permitted to pass laws prohibiting some religious practices.
And yet, such a non-literalist reading of the free exercise guarantee ought
not to be extended to allow government interference with religious practices
in the absence of some genuinely important justification.
A. Unsympathetic Beginnings
Unfortunately, as with many other fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees, the history of free exercise of religion in the United States and at the
Supreme Court is a history of difficulty in getting it right.26 In early relig-
ious liberty litigation, despite the First Amendment expressly allowing “no
law” prohibiting the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court approved
aggressive legal interference with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints—commonly referred to as the Mormon Church.27 In fact, the United
States Supreme Court avoided First Amendment difficulties by determining
that the Church of Latter-Day Saints was not truly a religion.28
The Supreme Court stated that “call[ing] [polygamy] a tenet of relig-
ion . . . offend[s] the common sense of mankind.”29 The polygamous prac-
tice of the Mormon Church was compared to religious traditions of human
sacrifice and determined to be a “cultus” activity that has long “been an
offence against society.”30 The Court claimed in Reynolds v. United States
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.; see generally Human Sacrifice, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/human-sacrifice (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
26. I have discussed this elsewhere. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Fall of Free Exer-
cise: From ‘No Law’ to Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid, ALB. L. REV. 1399,
1403–1409 (2007); Vincent Martin Bonventre, Religious Liberty as American History, 17 UPDATE
ON L.-RELATED EDUC. 41, 43–44 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
28. See id. at 166; Davis v. Beason, 333 U.S. 333, 345 (1890).
29. Davis, 333 U.S. at 342.
30. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
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that “[p]olygamy has always been odious.” The Court went further and, in
diluting the Constitution’s guarantee that “no law” shall prohibit religious
freedom, insisted that protecting religious polygamy under the First
Amendment would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief supe-
rior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself.”31
One might well ask whether protecting religious polygamy necessarily
would have such drastic ramifications. And, more basic than that, whether
the constitutional immunity explicitly provided to religious exercise by the
First Amendment made religious freedom superior to legislation.
Following its decision in Reynolds, the Court in Davis v. Beason again
ruled against the Mormons. Explaining that “[w]hile legislation for the es-
tablishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it
does not follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated,”32
the Court upheld severe penalties for polygamy and even for professing a
belief in polygamy.33 Between its decisions in Reynolds, Davis, and The
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States,34 the Court approved the Mormons’ felony convictions, loss of vot-
ing rights, and forfeiture of property, for practicing their sincerely held re-
ligious belief.
There were, to be sure, decisions interfering with the free exercise of
religion that were less questionable. For example, the State of Massachu-
setts passed legislation mandating smallpox vaccinations for adults, and it
disallowed exemptions based on religious beliefs.35 The Supreme Court
held that the legislation was “enacted in a reasonable and proper exercise of
the police power” and was “maintained by high medical authority.”36 The
need for the state to pass and uphold laws to protect citizens from conta-
gious or infectious diseases was deemed significantly to outweigh religious-
based objections.37
But then there is the case of United States v. Schwimmer, where the
Supreme Court held that the religious practice of pacifism was not protected
by constitutional free exercise.38 In this ultimately overruled decision in-
volving the pacifist religious beliefs of Quakers, the Court infamously ruled
that individuals who immigrated to this country were not entitled to be nat-
uralized as citizens if they would not take up arms.39 The Court character-
ized pacifists as “offenders [of] the principles of the Constitution” who
31. Id.
32. Davis, 333 U.S. at 345.
33. Id. at 345, 348.
34. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
35. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
36. Id. at 30, 35.
37. See id. at 28–29.
38. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
39. See id. at 652–653.
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were “incapable of the . . . devotion to the principles of our Constitution
that [are] required of aliens seeking naturalization.”40
A significant dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, joined by Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis, provided some exception to the Court’s collective ig-
nominy.41 Two of the truly eminent Justices in Supreme Court history
combined their voices in a powerful dissent in Schwimmer.42 Holmes, the
named author of that opinion, declared that “there is [no] principle of the
Constitution that [is] more imperative[ ] than . . . the principle of free
thought.”43 Holmes continued with words that should have made the major-
ity even more uncomfortable: “I had not supposed that [the Court] would
expel [the Quakers] because they believe more than some of us do in the
teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.”44
B. A Preferred Freedom
Several years thereafter, in 1937, change was in the making at the Su-
preme Court.45 This particular time in American constitutional history is
often labeled after the “switch in time [that] saved nine”—the famous quote
of Thomas Reed Powell that referred to the change in voting at the Court
that is sometimes credited with defeating President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
court-packing plan.46 At the time, the Court was comprised of four stalwart
conservatives (Justices Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, George Suther-
land, and James C. McReynolds), the three liberal “musketeers” (Justices
Harlan F. Stone, Louis D. Brandeis, and Benjamin N. Cardozo), and two
swing members (Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes and Justice Owen J.
Roberts). In the years preceding 1937, the Court repeatedly invalidated
President Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives, as well as similar social welfare
state laws, doing so for a variety of different reasons.47
Whether the laws provided for maximum hours, minimum wages,
child labor restrictions, workplace safety, food health, regulations on
40. Id. at 652.
41. Id. at 653–655. As I often tell my students, regardless of the vote in a decision being
seven to two, or even eight to one, if the dissent is by Justice Brandeis, Holmes, Cardozo, or
another jurist of such extraordinary stature, it’s almost a certainty that the dissent had the much
better opinion and resolution for the case.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 654–655.
44. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655. Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931), the Court repeated itself, this time upholding the denial of naturalization to a pacifist
chaplain at Yale University. But this time, the Court’s majority was a bare five votes. Holmes and
Brandeis were now joined in dissent by Justices Charles Evans Hughes and Harlan Stone. Ulti-
mately, seventeen years after Schwimmer, the dissent became the majority and the Court explicitly
overruled Schwimmer and Macintosh in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
45. A. Frank Reel, When a Switch in Time Saved Nine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1985), http://
www.nytimes.com/1985/11/10/opinion/l-when-a-switch-in-time-saved-nine-143165.html.
46. Id.
47. See id.; Daniel E. Ho & Kevin Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69, 70 (2010).
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pharmaceuticals, or Social Security, the Supreme Court invalidated the leg-
islation.48 And it did so for a host of different reasons to justify the major-
ity’s holdings in support of its extremely pro-business philosophy.49 But in
1937, the Court took a turn and the decisions changed. They did so because
the “swing” justices, ostensibly—whether or not actually—fearful of
Roosevelt’s proposed court-packing, started voting with the liberal “muske-
teers” instead of the conservative stalwarts.50 Suddenly, many of the re-
vived social welfare laws of the New Deal, as well as of the states, were
upheld by the Court.51
Hence, the “switch in time”—i.e., Hughes’ and Roberts’ voting with
the other side—is viewed as having “saved nine.”52 Eventually the con-
servative stalwarts began to retire from the Court, giving Roosevelt the op-
portunity to replace them,53 and the much differently composed Court, not
surprisingly, began to behave much differently.54
The Court’s behavior and, indeed, its overall jurisprudence changed
dramatically. In large measure owing to justices such as Benjamin Cardozo,
the Court established religious liberty as among the “Honor Roll of Supe-
rior Rights” deserving of special constitutional protection.55 In Palko v.
Connecticut, Cardozo authored the Court’s opinion in a case involving a
question of federal constitutional double jeopardy protection applying to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.56 In addressing that specific is-
sue, however, Cardozo—in his typically eloquent and masterful fashion—
articulated the seminal jurisprudence of constitutional rights that remains
the foundation of fundamental rights and liberties in America today.57
In Palko, Cardozo recognized that there are certain rights that are es-
sential to a free society.58 Such a society could not exist without rights such
as free speech, freedom of the press, and the right to counsel in a criminal
prosecution.59 Without these protections—fundamental rights—there can
48. See William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme
Court—and Lost, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2005), www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-
franklin-roosevelt-clashed-with-the-supreme-court-and-lost-78497994/.
49. See id.
50. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 47, at 70; Reel, supra note 45.
51. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 47, at 70; Reel, supra note 45.
52. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 47, at 70; Reel, supra note 45.
53. See Reel, supra note 45; HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE
COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 512 (8th ed. 2003).
54. See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 53, at 14.
55. See id. at 62–66 (discussing Cardozo’s seminal opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937)).
56. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 321.
57. See ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 53, at 96, 108; see also Howard J. Vogel, The “Or-
dered Liberty” of Substantive Due Process and the Future of Constitutional Law as a Rhetorical
Art: Variations on a Theme from Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L.
REV. 1473, 1483–1501 (2007).
58. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–325.
59. Id.
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be no free and fair society.60 Among these fundamental rights, Cardozo
included religious freedom. Along with those indispensable others, “the free
exercise of religion [is] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”61—
”neither liberty nor justice would exist if [such fundamental rights] were
sacrificed.”62
In the years shortly thereafter, the Court enforced free exercise in a
series of decisions dealing with proselytizing and solicitation by Jehovah’s
Witnesses. It did so by prohibiting the application of various licensing, tax-
ing, and bookselling laws to religious activities.63 But the foremost
landmark of the period, one of the most magnificently composed decisions
in Court history, arose in the context of state laws mandating that public
school children salute the American flag.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,64 the state law
requiring children to recite the pledge of allegiance and salute the flag
treated failure to do so as “insubordination,” resulting in the expulsion of
the child and prosecution of the parents.65 The religious beliefs of the Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses, including a literal belief in certain verses of Exodus, pre-
cluded them from obeying the West Virginia law.66 Accordingly, the
children refused to perform the requisite pledge and salute, they were ex-
pelled, and their parents were prosecuted.67
The Supreme Court, three years earlier, had upheld a similar state law
against similar religious objections.68 This time, however, the religious ob-
jections prevailed. In what might well have been providential, the task to
author the Court’s opinion fell upon Justice Robert H. Jackson. Perhaps the
most beautiful stylist in Supreme Court history,69 Jackson penned what is
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 326.
63. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
distribution of literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (tax for soliciting orders
for articles); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (license tax on bookselling). Curi-
ously, the early history of free exercise jurisprudence can be felicitously summed up as the
Mormons losing their cases and the Jehovah’s Witnesses winning theirs—compare Reynolds, Da-
vis, and The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints with Martin, Murdock,
and Jones, and, of course, with the decision in the landmark case to be discussed presently. The
contrasting outcomes no doubt resulted, at least in part, due to the different eras in which the cases
arose—the Jehovah’s Witness cases being decided after the 1937 change in the Court’s overall
jurisprudence and, particularly, it’s much more protective treatment of fundamental liberties.
64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 629.
67. Id. at 630.
68. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
69. See e.g., Bryan A. Garner, Celebrating the Powerful Eloquence of Justice Robert Jack-
son, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/powerful_eloquence
_justice_robert_jackson. As the holder of the Justice Jackson chair at Albany Law School—where
Jackson received his single year of formal legal education—I am admittedly partial. But I have
been stirred by Justice Jackson’s prose, as well as by that of Benjamin Cardozo, since my days at
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surely one of the most beautiful paeans to First Amendment freedom or,
indeed—to paraphrase Cardozo in Palko—to the scheme of liberty implicit
in American free government.
In response to arguments that the Court ought to defer to the legislative
enactments of the people’s elected representatives, Jackson reminded us of
the meaning of higher law:70
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of wor-
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be sub-
mitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.71
And while most actions taken by government are within its valid au-
thority as long as based on some reasonable purpose, much more than that
is required to justify interference with fundamental liberties. As Jackson put
it:
[F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship
may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are suscepti-
ble of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the State may lawfully protect.72
Jackson then explained why the Court should not and would not permit
intrusion on these paramount liberties except in those rare circumstances
where the government’s justification was so compelling. He did so in some
of the most oft-quoted and most stirring words in the United States Reports:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do
not now occur to us.73
Concluding for the Court, Jackson announced its decision in no uncer-
tain terms. “[C]ompelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitu-
the University of Virginia in Supreme Court seminars taught by Henry J. Abraham who would
recite from memory so many of the powerful and poignant passages from Jackson’s opinions. See
generally Robert H. Jackson Center, Henry Abraham (2003) Interview, YOUTUBE (Jul. 18, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NKejQ3_mvU. Though he only attended Albany Law
School for one academic year, 1911–1912, he recognized the law school as his alma mater, and it
recognized him as its graduate, on his return for commencement nearly thirty years later. See
Commencement Address of United States Attorney-General Jackson, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1941, at
1.
70. That term, as used here, is from a classic work. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE HIGHER
LAW BACKGROUND ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955).
71. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638 (1943).
72. Id. at 639.
73. Id. at 642.
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tional limitations,” he wrote, for it “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to re-
serve from all official control.”74
Twenty years hence, the Supreme Court confronted another religious
objection, from another religious minority, resulting in another religious lib-
erty landmark. This time, the case involved Saturday Sabbatarians, the Sev-
enth Day Adventists, who were bound not to work on their religious day of
rest.75 In Sherbert v. Verner, an employee’s refusal to work on her Saturday
Sabbath was treated by the state as “without good cause.”76 Consequently,
the employee not only lost her job, but she was also determined to be ineli-
gible for unemployment benefits.77
That determination, however, was overruled by the Supreme Court
which held that a state “may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provi-
sions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions re-
specting the day of rest.”78 The Court explained that “to condition the
availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardi-
nal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of
her constitutional liberties.”79 Government may not force an individual to
“choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting bene-
fits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand.”80 Substantial infringements on
free exercise of religion, even unintended “incidental burden[s] on free ex-
ercise,”81 may be justified only by “some compelling state interest.”82 The
Court, speaking through Justice William Brennan, was unequivocal about
the Court’s ruling and rationale:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensi-
tive constitutional area, “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.” No
such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case.83
Nearly a decade later, even as the Court grew increasingly conserva-
tive in many areas of the law, with a new Chief Justice and several other
74. Id. In yet another memorable passage, Jackson warned about seeking national unity
through forced patriotic uniformity: “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the una-
nimity of the graveyard.” Id. at 641.
75. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
76. Id. at 401.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 410.
79. Id. at 406.
80. Id. at 404.
81. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
82. Id. at 406.
83. Id. at 406–407 (citation omitted).
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appointees of President Richard Nixon,84 it rendered a decision that
equaled, if not exceeded, the earlier landmarks safeguarding religious lib-
erty. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,85 Amish parents sought an exemption from the
state law that mandated school-attendance for children until the age of six-
teen.86 The parents objected on religious grounds, fearing the worldly influ-
ence from the compulsory education beyond the basics of reading, writing,
and arithmetic taught in elementary school.87 When the parents failed to
enroll their under-sixteen children in school, the parents were charged and
convicted of violating the state law.88
Despite the “general applicability” of the law, as well as the conced-
edly “strong interest” underlying it, the Supreme Court ruled that the Amish
were entitled to an exemption.89 Rejecting the state’s argument to the con-
trary, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren Burger, recounted
what those earlier landmarks had settled:
Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin’s
requirement for school attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to
all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate
against religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by
legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its face may,
in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional require-
ment for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free ex-
ercise of religion.90
Then, distilling the standard to be applied whenever government inter-
fered with religious liberty, the Chief Justice was emphatic:
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is
that only those interests of the highest order and those not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion.91
To be sure, the right to free exercise of religion is not absolute and has
never been considered as such by the Court. Even in the era of robust pro-
tection of religious liberty and the stringent standards established to justify
any abridgement, the Court recognized justifiable limits on that fundamen-
tal freedom. In another opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger,
84. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
205 (3d ed. 1993); see generally Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Burger Court (1969–1986), 27
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 31 (1987).
85. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
86. Id. at 207.
87. See id. at 208–211.
88. See id. at 207–208.
89. Id. at 236.
90. Id. at 220.
91. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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the Court identified one of those limits when it addressed the racially dis-
criminatory religious practices of Bob Jones University.92
The officials of that university, who “genuinely believe[d] that the Bi-
ble forbids interracial dating and marriage,” governed their institution in
accord with this “fundamentalist” interpretation and, to effectuate their re-
ligious belief, historically refused to admit African American students.93
Following a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals prohibiting
racial exclusion in private schools, however, Bob Jones University opened
its doors to Black applicants—but only to unmarried ones.94 Moreover, ap-
plicants who were either engaged in or supportive of interracial marriage or
dating were denied admission or, if already enrolled, were expelled.95 Simi-
larly, the university maintained racial segregation policies on participation
in student organizations.96
Under the administration of President Richard Nixon, the Internal Rev-
enue Service began to challenge the tax exempt status of any private school
that practiced racial discrimination in admissions.97 When the IRS, in ac-
cord with its policy against racial discrimination, revoked Bob Jones’s tax-
exempt status in 1976,98 the university filed suit claiming a violation of
their Free Exercise of Religion under the First Amendment.99
Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the IRS policy
was vigorously enforced.100 When Carter lost the election in 1980, how-
ever, the administration of President Ronald Reagan sought to repeal the
relevant regulation.101 Indeed, although some Carter holdovers in the Jus-
tice Department disagreed, the Reagan administration submitted an amicus
brief to the Supreme Court in opposition of the IRS regulation.102
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger made clear that denying
“charitable” status and, therefore, tax benefits to an educational institution
should be done “only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved
is contrary to a fundamental public policy.”103 But, he continued that “there
can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in education violates
92. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
93. Id. at 580.




97. See id. at 581.
98. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 581.
99. Id. at 582.
100. See Olati Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion,
and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence 14 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Papers, Paper No. 9184).
101. Id. at 15–16.
102. Id. at 15, 17.
103. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 592.
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deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice.”104 Then, summa-
rizing the Court’s religious freedom case law, he explained that
the Free Exercise Clause provides substantial protection for law-
ful conduct grounded in religious belief. However, “[n]ot all bur-
dens on religion are unconstitutional. . . . The state may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”105
Chief Justice Burger proceeded to apply that free exercise jurispru-
dence to the particular case and to conclude that denying tax benefits to the
religious school was appropriate:
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. . . . [T]he
Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed,
with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s con-
stitutional history. That governmental interest substantially out-
weighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests as-
serted by [Bob Jones University] cannot be accommodated with
that compelling governmental interest; and no “less restrictive
means” are available to achieve the governmental interest.106
The Bob Jones University decision solidified the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence of religious liberty. That freedom held a preferred position as a
fundamental constitutional right “implicit in the scheme of ordered liberty,”
as Cardozo characterized it a half-century earlier.107 And as such, similarly
to the freedoms of speech and press and peaceable assembly, may not be
abridged unless there is no alternative way to achieve a “compelling,”
“overriding” interest.108
C. No Longer Preferred
Just a few years hence, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a majority
of his colleagues, denied that the Court had ever really adopted such juris-
prudence.109 Constitutional and religious scholars of all political and ideo-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 603 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–258
(1982)).
106. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
107. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
108. See Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 604. During this same period, the Court similarly
found other government interests to outweigh claimed infringements on free exercise claims. See
e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (ruling that the government’s internal use of social
security numbers outweighs religious objections to such numbers being assigned); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (deferring to military need for discipline in dress uniformity to
defeat request to wear religious headgear).
109. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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logical stripes found that opinion to be shocking110 and, at the least,
disingenuous.111 In it, the majority recharacterized the freedom to exercise
religion in a way that “dramatically depart[ed] from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence, appear[ed] unnecessary to resolve the question
presented, and [was] incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commit-
ment to individual religious liberty.”112
The underlying facts involved members of a Native American church
whose rituals included the centuries-old sacramental use of peyote.113 When
those church members were fired from their jobs and denied unemployment
benefits because they had violated the state’s criminal drug law, they
claimed entitlement to a Free Exercise exemption for their concededly sin-
cere religious practice.114 But notwithstanding previous landmarks which
seemed clearly to mandate an exemption, the Court this time, in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, declaring exactly the opposite of what those
landmarks had held, denied the exemption:
[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the
[law], but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.115
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreeing with the ultimate result in the
case, but condemning the majority’s newly eviscerated protection of relig-
ious liberty, catalogued a long line of decisions that demonstrated what the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence actually had been. That long line of deci-
sions protected Free Exercise
by requiring the Government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and
by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Her-
nandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–258 (1982); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–629 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
110. See e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990) (finding that the majority’s “purported . . . use of precedent is
troubling, bordering on the shocking”); see also Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protec-
tion of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275;
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990).
111. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, Symposium, A Second-Class Constitutional Right?
Free Exercise and the Current State of Religious Freedom in the United States, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1399 (2007).
112. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
113. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660, 667 n.11 (1988).
114. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 874–875 (1990).
115. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-3\UST306.txt unknown Seq: 15 14-SEP-18 9:02
664 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:3
U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). The compel-
ling interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s command that
religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a pre-
ferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments
upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by
clear and compelling governmental interests “of the highest or-
der,” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.116
Despite O’Connor’s catalogue of decisions impeaching the majority’s
characterization of the Court’s Free Exercise case law, Scalia insisted that
“[o]ur decisions reveal that . . . [w]e have never held that an individual’s
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”117 And in support of
that indisputably inaccurate proposition, Scalia relied upon and quoted from
an overruled 1940 decision, Minersville School District Board of Education
v. Gobitis.118 That decision, upholding a mandatory flag salute and Pledge
of Allegiance for school children despite religious objections, was of course
repudiated by the Court three years later in Justice Jackson’s magnificent
opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.119
Among other decisions Scalia relied upon, in addition to the overruled
Gobitis, were the 1879 decision upholding anti-polygamy laws against
Mormons,120 the 1944 decision upholding child labor laws against Jehovah
Witnesses,121 and the more contemporary decisions upholding military con-
scription against conscientious objectors122 and social security taxes against
the Amish.123 But, in fact, what was made pellucidly clear in that latter
1982 case relied upon by Scalia is precisely the opposite of what Scalia was
insisting. In that case, United States v. Lee, the Court was explicit and une-
quivocal about the sum and substance of its prior decisions applying the
Free Exercise guarantee. “The state may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding govern-
mental interest”124—not simply by any “generally applicable” and “other-
wise valid” law.125
116. Id. at 894–895 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The three dissenting Justices—William Bren-
nan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun—joined that part of O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ion. Id. at 891.
117. Id. at 878.
118. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–595 (1940)).
119. See supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text.
120. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
121. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
122. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
123. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
124. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
125. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). Scalia dismissed the Free
Exercise protections enforced in many of the landmark decisions by insisting that those cases
involved other fundamental rights. So Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (compulsory
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And yet, as a result of Smith, Scalia’s formulation has effectively re-
moved free exercise of religion from its previously preferred place where it
was immunized from abridgement except for the most compelling govern-
ment reasons. Indeed, Justice Jackson’s pronouncement for the Court in
Barnette, that the “freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship . . . are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immedi-
ate danger,”126 is no longer true for religious liberty. Instead of that “com-
pelling interest” protection for free exercise which, according to the
majority in Smith, “contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense”127 and even “court[s] anarchy,”128 any hospitality toward that free-
dom should be left to the democratic process.
Indeed, lest there be any doubt that the Smith majority anticipated and
intended that to be the very consequence of its ruling, Scalia stated it
plainly in concluding his opinion for the Court:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be preferred.129
D. The Aftermath of Employment Division v. Smith
Condemnation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith was immedi-
ate and widespread. Specifically, Scalia’s recharacterization of the Court’s
free exercise landmarks and jurisprudence was met with the harshest criti-
cism.130 The most eminent constitutional and religious liberty scholars re-
acted with both shock and disbelief.131 Indeed, scholarly reflections on the
decision many years later continued to evince dismay and outright hostil-
ity.132 Representative of those views were the observations of one such
scholar expressed seventeen years after the decision was rendered:
school attendance) was really about parental rights and W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute) was solely about free speech. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at
881–882. Scalia dismissed the Saturday Sabbatarian cases of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) and Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) as simply aberrational decisions confined to
denials of unemployment benefits. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 883–884.
126. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
127. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 885.
128. Id. at 888.
129. Id. at 890.
130. Much of that criticism mirrored the concurring and dissenting opinions: Smith II, 494
U.S. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (the majority “disregard[ed] our consistent application of
free exercise doctrine”); id. at 907–908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Until today, I thought this
was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
131. See e.g., Laycock, supra note 110; McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, supra note 110.
132. Scalia’s assertions and newly refashioned rule in Oregon v. Smith were condemned by
constitutional and religious scholars of all political and ideological stripes. See, e.g., Symposium,
A Second Class Constitutional Right? Free Exercise and the Current State of Religious Freedom
in the United States, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1399 (2007). See also Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom
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Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in that case did not
acknowledge that it was discarding a free exercise approach that
had been in place for many years, the opinion in fact turned ex-
isting free exercise law on its head. . . . It is difficult to believe
that the Framers of the federal Constitution, who valued religious
liberty so highly, would have relegated it to so peripheral a status
and put it so much at the mercy of majoritarian beliefs and insen-
sitivities as Employment Division v. Smith assumes.133
Another religious liberty scholar was even more blunt about what the
Court had done with the (formerly?) fundamental First Amendment
guarantee:
[T]his right was essentially written out of the Constitution by the
Supreme Court in [Employment Division v. Smith]. To put it
plainly, I believe that the decision in that case effectively repealed
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the US Con-
stitution rendering it, at best, a second class right.134
Similarly, the other two branches of the federal government disagreed
vehemently with the Supreme Court majority’s re-rendering of the free ex-
ercise right. The House of Representatives unanimously passed a bill spon-
sored by then Representative Charles Schumer to overrule Oregon v. Smith
and to reinstate the “compelling interest” test as spelled out in Wisconsin v.
Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner.135 The Senate, where the bill was sponsored
by Senator Edward Kennedy,136 passed the bill by a vote of 97 to 3.137
President Bill Clinton then signed the bill into law.138
The legislation, titled the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”),139 in veritable denunciation of Scalia’s majority opinion in
Smith, declared that:
The Congress finds that . . . in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the re-
quirement that the government justify burdens on religious exer-
and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now than It Was Then, 32
CORDOZO L. REV. 2033 (2011); Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1999).
133. Gary J. Simson, Reflections on Free Exercise: Revisiting Rourke v. Department of Cor-
rectional Services, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1426–1427, 1433 (2007).
134. Timothy A. Byrnes, The Politics of a Second Class Right: Free Exercise in Contempo-
rary America, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1441, 1441 (2007) (emphasis added).
135. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/actions.
136. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/senate-bill/578.
137. H.R. 1308, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/all-actions?
overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D.
138. H.R. 1308, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/all-actions?q=
%7B%22action-by%22%3A%22Executive+Branch%22%7D.
139. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103–141 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1993)).
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cise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and [ ] the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings
is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.140
[Therefore,] to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened
. . . .
141
. . . .
[The g]overnment may substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the bur-
den to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest.142
In repudiating Smith, the purpose of RFRA was not only to restore
religious liberty protection to that which had been provided in Sherbert and
Yoder. More broadly, it was to return free exercise of religion to the pre-
ferred status it previously enjoyed with other fundamental rights. Like other
First Amendment rights and other vital freedoms, religious liberty was once
again to enjoy the protection of the “compelling interest” standard. Under
RFRA, burdens on the freedom to practice one’s religion would once again
be subjected to enhanced or “strict” scrutiny and, thus, be permitted only
when necessary to accomplish some exceedingly important government
interest.
Indeed, contrary to Scalia’s insistence in Smith that such a standard
contravened constitutional tradition and common sense, and that it courted
anarchy,143 such enhanced or strict scrutiny has in fact been the standard
long applied by the Supreme Court to protect fundamental rights gener-
ally.144 Where government has interfered with one of those most basic civil
rights or liberties—whether it be free speech,145 freedom of association,146
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4)–(5) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at § 2000bb–1(b) (emphasis added).
143. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 888 (1990).
144. The compelling interest or strict scrutiny test, however phrased, has been the standard
generally applied by the Supreme Court to government intrusions on fundamental rights at least
since the era that produced Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s foundational opinion in Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (establishing the doctrine of fundamental rights as those “implicit in the
scheme of ordered liberty”) and, the very next year, Justice Harlan Stone’s famed footnote four in
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the need for
“more exacting judicial scrutiny” to protect political rights). See generally ABRAHAM & PERRY,
supra note 53, at 14–32.
145. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Simon & Shuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
146. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
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the right to vote,147 racial equal treatment,148 or others deemed essential to
the American scheme of liberty149—that interference has been ruled consti-
tutionally invalid, unless government could satisfy the heightened scrutiny
of the compelling interest test.
Sixteen years after the decision in Smith—and the very next year after
he was appointed to the Court150—Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for
his unanimous colleagues, applied RFRA on behalf of religious objectors
and seemed clearly to share the sentiments underlying that legislation.151 In
rebutting the government’s argument, that the good reasons Congress had
for enacting the Controlled Substances Act justified denying the religious
exemption sought in this case, Roberts explained what he viewed as the
overriding purposes of RFRA:
The Government repeatedly invokes Congress’ findings and pur-
poses underlying the Controlled Substances Act, but Congress
had a reason for enacting RFRA, too. Congress recognized that
“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise,” and
legislated “the compelling interest test” as the means for the
courts to “strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.” 42 U.S.C.
§§2000bb(a)(2), (5).152
In addition to his evident concurrence with the reasoning underlying
RFRA, Roberts rejected the government’s characterization of several pre-
Smith decisions,153 which was similar to how Scalia had characterized them
in that case.154 Those decisions, as Roberts explained, did not stand for the
proposition that a generally applicable valid law necessarily defeated a free
exercise claim for an exemption. Rather, as Roberts unequivocally stated:
Those cases did not embrace the notion that a general interest in
uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious exercise;
they instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why the
denied exemptions could not be accommodated. In United States
v. Lee [citation omitted], for example, the Court rejected a
claimed exception to the obligation to pay Social Security taxes,
147. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
148. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
149. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (parental rights); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 16 (1968) (right to interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
150. John G. Roberts, Jr., nominated to be Chief Justice of the United States by President
George W. Bush, was confirmed by the Senate on September 29, 2005. See Current Members,
SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
151. Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita Beneficente Unia˜o do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
152. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 435.
154. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 879–880.
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noting that “mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal
vitality of the social security system” and that the “tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the
tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that vio-
lates their religious belief.” [Citations omitted] See also Her-
nandez v. Commissioner [citations omitted] (same). In Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court de-
nied a claimed exception to Sunday closing laws, in part because
allowing such exceptions “might well provide [the claimants]
with an economic advantage over their competitors who must re-
main closed on that day.” The whole point of a “uniform day of
rest for all workers” would have been defeated by exceptions. See
Sherbert [citations omitted] (discussing Braunfeld). These cases
show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest
in uniform application of a particular program by offering evi-
dence that granting the requested religious accommodations
would seriously compromise its ability to administer the
program.155
But O Centro involved the application of RFRA to federal legislation.
Several years earlier, and only a few years after the enactment of RFRA, the
Court invalidated the application of that statute to state and local laws.156
According to the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, Congress had exceeded
its authority in attempting to impose, upon the states and their subdivisions,
greater protection than the First Amendment provided for religious
freedom.157
In that case, a church had sought to utilize RFRA’s protection to obtain
a religious exemption to a local zoning ordinance.158 But the Court ruled
that Congress’s attempt to impose the compelling interest standard to pro-
tect free exercise, in contradiction to the rejection of that standard in Smith,
was beyond the power given to Congress in the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce constitutional rights against the states.159 Under that Amendment’s
grant of power, Congress could enforce Smith’s limited free exercise pro-
tection against state and local laws, but nothing more.160
Hence, the statutory “compelling interest” protection of RFRA does
not apply to burdens imposed on religious liberty by state or local govern-
ments. Instead, the “otherwise valid” constitutional standard of Smith is the
applicable test for determining the legality of those governments’ interfer-
155. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435.
156. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
157. See id. at 519, 534–536.
158. See id. at 512.
159. See id. at 534–536. Chief Justice Roberts stated it plainly in O Centro: “As originally
enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997), we held the application to States to be beyond Congress’ legislative author-
ity under [Sec.] 5 of the 14th Amendment.” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 424 n.1.
160. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 534–536.
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ing with the First Amendment right of free exercise.161 Moreover, regarding
interferences with religious liberty by the federal government, Smith is the
standard for free exercise of religion under the Constitution. The protection
previously afforded against federal intrusion, by landmarks such as Sher-
bert and Yoder, are now available only statutorily under RFRA.
E. The Constitution, the Statute, and the States
The First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Exercise of Religion pro-
tects religious liberty against both federal and state actions.162 But since
Smith, that guarantee only protects against laws that are not “otherwise
valid.”163 If a law is invalid for some other reason—e.g., it is invalid be-
cause it violates some other constitutional right—then free exercise is pro-
tected, albeit incidentally so.164 This would similarly include laws that were
not “neutral” and “generally applicable”—i.e., laws that actually targeted
religion or particular religions.165 But such laws that discriminated on the
161. See id. at 536. Congress responded to City of Boerne by enacting the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), a “compelling government interest” stat-
ute like RFRA but with a much narrower scope and based on the Spending and Commerce pow-
ers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. As explained by the Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
715–716 (2005): “Congress again responded, this time by enacting RLUIPA. Less sweeping than
RFRA, and invoking federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, RLUIPA
targets two areas . . . land-use regulation [and] institutionalized persons . . . in a program or
activity that receives Federal financial assistance [or affects] commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.”
162. The First Amendment’s free exercise guarantee was deemed one of the fundamental
rights made assertable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Justice Cardozo’s
opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–325 (1937), see supra notes
64–74 and accompanying text. Its application to the states was then treated as settled in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
163. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 878–879 (1990).
164. Id. at 881–882. Scalia referred to these cases where free exercise was incidentally pro-
tected only because some other right was actually violated as “hybrid situation[s].” In his opinion
for the Court, he explained this novel proposition as follows: “The only decisions in which we
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exer-
cise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of
the press, see Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304–307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and
charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause
he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax
on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(invalidating compulsory school attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on
religious grounds to send their children to school).” Smith II, 494 U.S. at 881.
165. Id. at 879–880. Among other cases cited for this proposition, Justice Scalia relied upon
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), where the Court had denied a claim for a religious
exemption from child labor laws stating, as quoted by Scalia, there was “no constitutional infir-
mity in ‘excluding [these children] from doing there what no other children may do.’” Prince, 321
U.S. at 171 (quoted in Smith II, 494 U.S. at 880).
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basis of religion would be invalid in any event as equal protection
violations.166
So it is not clear from Smith what little protection remains, if any, that
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion actually provides in
and of itself.167 But whatever that might be, it applies to both federal and
state government actions.
By contrast with constitutional free exercise, the statutory protection
under RFRA168 is strong. Legislatively reviving the compelling interest
standard of Sherbert and Yoder that significantly restricted burdens on re-
ligious liberty, Congress intended RFRA to restore free exercise to the pro-
tected status it formerly had and which other fundamental rights enjoy. But
unlike the constitutional protection enjoyed by other fundamental rights,169
that statutory protection for religious liberty extends only against federal
interference. The Court in City of Boerne blocked the application of RFRA
to any state and local actions.170 Henceforth, Smith’s minimalist
(re)construing of constitutional free exercise is the outer limit of Congress’s
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.171
Of course, individual states themselves may choose to protect constitu-
tional rights under their own law beyond those standards set by the Su-
166. The full quote from Prince makes this clear: “However Jehovah’s Witnesses may con-
ceive them, the public highways have not become their religious property merely by their asser-
tion. And there is no denial of equal protection in excluding their children from doing there what
no other children may do.” 321 U.S. at 170–171 (emphasis added). Indeed, it is settled doctrine
that constitutional equal protection prohibits government action that discriminates on the basis of
religion. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (equal protection prohibits
“an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–217 (1982) ([I]n accord with “elemental
constitutional premises . . . we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that
disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’) (em-
phasis added) (footnotes omitted); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[A]
classification [that] trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” will not be presumed to be constitutional.) (empha-
sis added).
167. This is no idiosyncratic observation. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Reflections on Free Exer-
cise: Revisiting Rourke v. Department of Correctional Services, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1430
(2007) (Smith II “relegated [free exercise] to so peripheral a status”); Timothy A. Byrnes, The
Politics of a Second Class Right: Free Exercise in Contemporary America, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1441
(2007) (“this right was essentially written out of the Constitution by the Supreme Court”); Lay-
cock, supra note 110, at 1–4 (“[T]he Court’s account of its precedents in Smith [II] is transpar-
ently dishonest . . . . [T]he Free Exercise Clause itself now has little independent substantive
content.”).
168. As well as its expansion under RLUIPA. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
169. See generally ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 53, at 14–32.
170. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 534–536.
171. Id. The Court did subsequently uphold the narrow application of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (“RLUIPA”) to state
and local land use regulations and prisons where there was either federal subsidization or impact
on interstate commerce, as within Congress’s spending and commerce powers. See Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715–716 (2005).
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preme Court under the federal Constitution.172 Free exercise of religion is
among those rights where states have often done so. Indeed, very shortly
after the Supreme Court had made that First Amendment right applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,173 New York’s highest court,
the Court of Appeals, made clear it would not be bound by less protective
federal standards.174 Speaking through Chief Judge Irving Lehman, the
state high court explained:
Parenthetically we may point out that in determining the scope
and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individ-
ual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is
bound to exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States limiting the
scope of similar guarantees in the Constitution of the United
States.175
More recently, some state courts have chosen to reject Smith and to
provide greater protection for religious liberty as a matter of independent
state constitutional law.176 Others have decided to do the opposite and have
adopted Smith’s “otherwise valid” standard as their own law.177 The result
is that the freedom to exercise religion is different in different parts of the
country. Despite free exercise being a fundamental right guaranteed by the
First Amendment of the Constitution—and made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment—there is no uniform, nationwide pro-
tection but, instead, it depends upon location. In some states that right is
protected as are other fundamental rights with the compelling interest test;
in other states it is protected with the bare minimum standard of Smith.
172. This is a basic truism of federalism recognized by the Court, by state courts, and by
constitutional scholars countless times. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)
(“Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent con-
straints.”); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (reaffirming “the authority
of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution”); William
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
399 (1987).
173. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324–325 (1937).
174. People v. Barber, 46 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1943) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s denial of a
religious exemption for Jehovah’s Witnesses from laws restricting door-to-door solicitation in
Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)).
175. Barber, 46 N.E.2d at 331.
176. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (adhering to the compel-
ling interest standard under the state constitution).
177. See, e.g., Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835 (Ky. 2012) (holding that the
state constitution provides the same protection as the First Amendment).
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1. The Constitution
As a consequence of its ruling in Smith, that any “otherwise valid law”
defeats a claim that constitutional free exercise of religion has been bur-
dened, the Supreme Court has protected that fundamental right—if at all—
only when the government action is otherwise invalid. So if a government
action violates constitutional freedom of speech, and that speech happens to
be religious, then religious liberty is protected as a by-product.178 Or if a
government action is not “neutral” or “generally applicable” within the
meaning of Smith—i.e., it actually targets a particular religion or religion
generally—then that action is invalid because it invidiously discriminates
on the basis of religion.179 But government actions that happen to interfere
with religious free exercise are no longer constitutionally invalid solely for
that reason.180
A brief review of the Court’s post-Smith decisions, where religious
freedom was constitutionally protected, makes these points clear. There are
those cases where the Court sided with the religious complainants, but only
because the government action was deemed to violate free speech rights.
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,181 de-
cided three years after Smith, involved a local school district that permitted
the use of its facilities after hours by various community groups, except for
religious purposes.182 The Court held that the denial of a church group’s
application to use the facilities to show a religious film series was an uncon-
stitutional viewpoint-based abridgement of free speech.183
Similarly, several years later in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School,184 the Court found another free speech violation where a Bible
group was denied the after-hours use of school facilities.185 Because the
denial was specifically based on the religious nature of the discussions in-
178. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (invalidating the
restriction on after-school use of facilities for discussion on non-religious subjects); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (invalidating the refusal of the state
university to fund a student organization’s publication because of its religious viewpoint); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (invalidating a school dis-
trict’s refusal to permit groups with a religious viewpoint to use its facilities).
179. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017) (invali-
dating the denial of state benefits to a church that were available to all other organizations);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating a
law that prohibited the animal slaughtering of only a particular disfavored religion).
180. Such interference with religious liberty may be illegal as a statutory matter under RFRA,
but not as a violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. See discussion of RFRA at supra
notes 135–161 and infra 215–240 and accompanying text.
181. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
182. Id. at 386.
183. Id. at 393–394.
184. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
185. Id. at 103–104.
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tended by the group, the Court deemed the case indistinguishable from the
viewpoint-based discrimination in Lamb’s Chapel.186
In a somewhat different context, but with the same result, a state uni-
versity—the University of Virginia, founded by Thomas Jefferson187—
sought to keep Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and state”188
high and impregnable.189 It therefore refused to provide student activity
funds to subsidize a student group’s religious publication. But in Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the Court held that the
denial of support for the students’ publication was a “denial of their right of
free speech”190—again, much like the viewpoint-based discrimination in
Lamb’s Chapel.191 And in another common thread tying all three cases to-
gether, Smith and the diminished right of free exercise that it defined were
entirely absent from the Court’s decisions.192
In two other decisions where the Court sided with religious claimants,
Smith did figure prominently—at least ostensibly so. Notably, the Court’s
reasoning in those cases was actually a rejection of invidious discrimina-
tion, not the protection of free exercise as a self-standing fundamental
liberty.193
186. Id. at 107.
187. See MALONE, supra note 6, at 251–282 (1981).
188. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 1801–1805, at 108–109
(1970) (discussing Jefferson’s 1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptists). The Supreme Court has often
relied on Jefferson’s letter to determine the meaning of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (referring to Jefferson’s letter as an
“authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First] amendment”).
189. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
190. Id. at 837.
191. Id. at 832.
192. The opinions for the Court in these three cases—authored by Justice Byron White in
Lamb’s Chapel, by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Rosenberger, and by Justice Clarence Thomas in
Good News—never even mentioned Smith as support for the decisions.
193. Others have also noted the Court’s modern approach to free exercise as being the
equivalent of equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Susan Gelman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou
Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 680–682 (2008); Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free
Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 338, 344 (2006). Some have
been urging such an approach to religious liberty. See, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equal-
ity, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313–314 (1986). In a more recent case, the Court did reject a
religious speech claim made under Rosenberger, Good News Club, Lamb’s Chapel, and earlier
analogous precedents—but this case did not involve the religious discrimination involved in those
cases. In Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the University of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661
(2010), a state law school denied an exemption from its policy, requiring open membership in all
student organizations, to a religious group that wished to exclude gays and lesbians. Id. at
672–673. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the five to four majority, reasoned that—unlike the regula-
tions at issue in those other cases—the membership requirement here was reasonable, viewpoint
neutral, applicable to all student groups, and thus constitutional despite the incidental burden on
the religious group. Id. at 694–696. Notably, the four dissenters who sided with the student
group—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—are the same Justices who
dissented in other major gay rights cases. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675
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In the first of those cases, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,194 the Court held that the local ordinance in question vio-
lated constitutionally guaranteed free exercise as outlined in Smith, because
the law was not a “neutral” law of “general applicability.”195 The facts
showed that the ordinance in question, which prohibited a narrowly drawn
category of animal slaughtering, deliberately targeted the practices of an
unpopular religious group for no reason other than “animosity” toward that
particular group.196 The Court, speaking through Justice Anthony Kennedy,
employed “an equal protection mode of analysis”197 and invalidated the or-
dinance because of its intentionally discriminatory treatment of a relig-
ion.198 In fact, the Court left no doubt that the free exercise violation it
found was discrimination, not merely some burden on religious practice.
The Court’s opinion is replete with explicit reference to discrimination, as
well as to precedents where the evil the Court says it had condemned was
unequal treatment.199
In the other post-Smith victory for constitutional free exercise, the
Court was even more emphatic that the impermissible evil was discrimina-
tory treatment of religion, not mere interference with it.200 In Trinity Lu-
theran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, a state law excluded religious
organizations from an otherwise generally available program that provided
grants to help improve child playgrounds.201 Explaining that this exclusion
violated constitutional religious liberty, the Court left no doubt about the
basis for its ruling. Speaking through Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court
began quite plainly: “The Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observ-
ers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that
target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious sta-
(2013) (invalidating discrimination against same-sex married couples in the Defense of Marriage
Act); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (recognizing a right to marry for same-sex
couples).
194. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
195. Id. at 531–532, 546–547.
196. Id. at 542.
197. Id. at 540 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
198. Id. at 537–538.
199. See id. at 532–538 (referring repeatedly to the evil of discrimination, to its unconstitu-
tionality, and to numerous cases in which unequal treatment on the basis of religion was the evil
disallowed in the Court’s rulings—not merely that free exercise happened to be burdened). In
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)—especially noteworthy
because the court’s opinion was authored by then Judge Samuel Alito—the circuit court relied on
Lukumi Babalu to invalidate the discriminatory treatment of religious objectors to the police de-
partment’s grooming policy; they were denied exemptions even though others were granted ex-
emptions for secular reasons.
200. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017).
201. Id. at 2017.
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tus.’”202 The Court proceeded to discuss prior decisions in which it had
forbidden discriminatory—not just burdensome—treatment of religion.203
Strikingly, the Court quoted quite favorably from Sherbert and Yoder
early in its analysis, despite the fact that those precedents had been dispar-
aged, if not repudiated, in Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith.204 Just as
notably, the Court did not even refer to Smith until several paragraphs later.
Then, when the Court did, it did so only to highlight that decision’s prohibi-
tion on religious discrimination.205 Adding to what was especially notable,
as well as particularly curious and revealing, was the evident embrace of
Sherbert’s condemnation of even “indirect” burdens on free exercise.206
Quoting approvingly from Sherbert, Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opin-
ion in Trinity Lutheran noted:
As the Court put it more than 50 years ago, “[i]t is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege.” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. . . . The “imposition of
such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deter[s]
or discourage[s] the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 405.207
The Court concluded by recalling that such conditions that penalize
free exercise “must be subjected to the ‘most rigorous’ scrutiny.208 In turn,
that means that “only a state interest ‘of the highest order’ can justify the
[state’s] discriminatory policy.”209 Finally, the Court readily applied that
“compelling” interest test210 to determine that the denial of benefits to a
religious entity that was “otherwise qualified” violated the Constitution’s
protection of free exercise.211
There was certainly no disdain for the compelling interest test applied
to religious liberty as there was in Smith.212 Scalia’s opinion for the Court
in that case had argued that
202. Id. at 2019 (quoting Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533, 542).
203. Id. Including, most prominently, McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), where a state
law disqualified religious ministers from running for political office.
204. Contrast id. at 2019–2020, 2022, with Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 883
(1990) (“We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test
except the denial of unemployment compensation. . . . In recent years we have abstained from
applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all.”), and Smith II at
881 (Yoder protected religious liberty only because that case involved “the right of parents to
direct the education of their children”) (citation omitted).
205. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.Ct. at 2020–2021.
206. Id. at 2022.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2024 (citation omitted).
209. Id. (citation omitted).
210. Id. The Court had just variously referred to this in terms of “the most rigorous scrutiny”
and “only a state interest of the highest order.” See id. at 2014.
211. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.Ct. at 2025.
212. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 885–886 (1990).
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The “compelling government interest” requirement seems benign,
because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the stan-
dard that must be met before the government may accord differ-
ent treatment on the basis of race, . . . or before the government
may regulate the content of speech . . . is not remotely
comparable. . . .213
But in Trinity Lutheran, the Court did apply the rigor of the compel-
ling interest test to a free exercise claim, much as it would have in a case
involving racial discrimination or interference with free speech. The Court
did not seem to have any hesitation or difficulty in doing so.214 Nor has the
Court had much difficulty applying that test in cases where RFRA—rather
than the limited Smith version of religious freedom—supplied the protec-
tion for free exercise.
2. The Statute
Following its ruling in City of Boerne, that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority in enacting Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),215 the Supreme Court made clear that it had only been referring to
RFRA’s attempted application to the states.216 Nine years after City of
Boerne, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita Beneficente Unia˜o do Vegetal, the
Court additionally made clear that RFRA did, however, validly apply to
federal burdens on free exercise.217
Ironically, the Court in O Centro was confronted with a question very
similar to that which it had faced in Smith. In both cases, a generally appli-
cable drug law imposed an incidental burden on a sincere religious use of a
prohibited substance.218 But the O Centro case involved the statutory pro-
tection of free exercise under RFRA, not the much diminished constitu-
tional protection of Smith—which RFRA was intended to undo.219 And in
applying the compelling interest test that was reinstituted in RFRA, the
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. Even the two dissenting Justices, whose concerns involved the separation of church and
state, did not raise any concerns about the compelling interest test or even mention it. See Trinity
Lutheran, 137 S.Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Ginsburg, J.).
215. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 534–536.
216. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (“In City of Boerne, this Court invali-
dated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress’
remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). In Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita
Beneficente Unia˜o do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Court repeated that, id. at 424 n.1, and
then proceeded to apply RFRA to a federal law.
217. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439 (applying RFRA to the federal Controlled Substances
Act).
218. See id. at 425; Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
219. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 424 (RFRA “adopts a statutory rule comparable to the consti-
tutional rule rejected in Smith.”).
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Court was unanimous in ruling for the religious objectors—precisely the
opposite of the result reached in Smith.220
As Chief Justice Roberts explained, in enacting RFRA
Congress . . . legislated “the compelling interest test” as the
means for the courts to “strik[e] sensible balances between relig-
ious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” . . . Ap-
plying that test, we conclude . . . the Government failed to
demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling in-
terest in barring the [religious group’s] sacramental use of [the
prohibited drug].221
Similarly, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,222 the Court applied
the compelling interest test and ruled in favor of the religious objectors.223
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)224
and regulations promulgated thereunder,225 covered employers were re-
quired to offer their employees health insurance that included contraceptive
coverage. The owners of several family owned businesses complained that
obeying that contraceptive mandate would violate their sincere religious be-
liefs.226 The Court held that, under RFRA, the religious objectors were enti-
tled to exemptions.227
Applying RFRA, the majority assumed arguendo that the government
had a compelling interest in requiring contraceptive coverage.228 But that
still left the question of whether it was necessary to impose that require-
ment on religious objectors—i.e., whether imposing that requirement was
the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest.229 And
the majority readily found such a less restrictive means in the very regula-
tions implementing ACA.230 Those regulations already afforded exemptions
to accommodate some religious objectors and, beyond that, the regulations
220. Contrast id. at 439, with Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890.
221. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439. Notably, there was not a peep about the compelling interest
test’s application to protect free exercise being contrary to tradition or to common sense or that it
was courting anarchy—not even from Justice Scalia who had insisted just that in Smith II, 494
U.S. at 885, 886, or from Justice Kennedy who had joined him. None of the other members of the
majority in that previous case were still on the Court for O Centro.
222. 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
223. Id. at 2759.
224. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119.
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (authorizing the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices to promulgate regulations to fulfill the legislative purposes of the Act).
226. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759, 2764–2766 (2014).
227. Id. at 2759, 2785. To be precise, the majority relied upon RFRA as “amend[ed]” by its
“sister statute” RLUIPA. Id. at 2772, 2781.
228. Id. at 2780,
229. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b)(2). Notably, there was no disagreement among
the Justices that the compelling interest test, including the “least restrictive means” analysis, ap-
plied in this case. Instead, the dissenters argued that for-profit corporations were not entitled to the
protections of RFRA, id. at 2793–2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) and that the exemptions sought
would undermine the government’s ability to achieve its compelling interest. Id. at 2799–2804.
230. Id. at 2781–2783.
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required the insurers to provide the contraceptive coverage themselves for
employees who wanted it.231 Hence, the majority concluded that there was
no reason to deny the same exemption to the religious objectors in this case,
since contraceptive coverage could be provided in the very same way to the
otherwise affected employees.232
The very next year, the Court again applied the statutorily mandated
compelling interest test233 and again ruled for the religious objector.234 In
Holt v. Hobbs, a devout Muslim, incarcerated in an Arkansas prison, ob-
jected on sincere religious grounds to shaving in accord with the state’s
corrections’ grooming policy.235 He was denied his request to maintain his
beard to one half-inch.236
The state claimed that its strict policy was necessary to promote prison
safety and security and, specifically, to prevent prisoners from hiding con-
traband.237 The Court, speaking through Justice Samuel Alito, responded
231. Id. at 2763, 2782. As the majority explained: “HHS has effectively exempted certain
religious nonprofit organizations [that] . . . oppose[ ] providing coverage for some or all of any
contraceptive services required to be covered . . . on account of religious objections.” . . . [T]he
issuer must then exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide separate
payments for contraceptive services for plan participants without imposing any cost-sharing re-
quirements on the eligible organization, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. Although
this procedure requires the issuer to bear the cost of these services, HHS has determined that this
obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its cost will be less than or equal to
the cost savings resulting from the services.” Id. at 2763 (citations omitted).
232. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2782 (concluding that such an implementation of ACA would
“not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious belief . . . and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally
well”). Notably, the majority’s approach under RFRA was the same the Court had mandated as a
constitutional protection in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (only “interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served” defeat free exercise claims), which was later repudi-
ated as unworkable in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 883–884 (1990).
See id. at 2760 (stating that Smith II “largely repudiated th[at] method of analyzing free-exercise
claims”). Notably also—and rather curiously—Justice Scalia, who authored the majority in Smith,
to do away with that approach, had no such concerns in Hobby Lobby. Rather, it was the more
liberal, Democratic appointees on the Court who expressed such concerns in a dissent by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 2805–2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Curiously also—and under the
category of how things change depending on what other interests are at stake—the ACLU which
had supported the compelling interest/strict scrutiny test in Smith II (and then condemned the
decision against a religious exemption in that case and urged passage of RFRA to overrule it),
turned against the application of that test and RFRA in Hobby Lobby. Contrast The ACLU and
Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-and-freedom-religion-
and-belief (last accessed Apr. 21, 2018) (favoring strict scrutiny and a religious exemption for the
Native Americans to use peyote in Smith, as well as urging passage of RFRA), with Leah Rutman,
The Hobby Lobby Decision: Imposing Religious Beliefs on Employees, ACLU (Aug. 11, 2014),
https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/hobby-lobby-decision-imposing-religious-beliefs-employees (op-
posing the application of RFRA to provide a religious exemption from the contraception mandate
in Hobby Lobby).
233. To be precise, the Court applied RLUIPA which the Court has described as an “amend-
ment” and “sister act” of RFRA. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2772, 2781. See also supra note 161.
234. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 859, 864–865 (2015) (citing and applying the same analy-
sis as in Hobby Lobby).
235. See id. at 859.
236. See id. at 861.
237. See id. at 863.
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that, while the restriction of contraband in prison facilities is a compelling
interest, “the argument that this interest would be seriously compromised by
allowing an inmate to grow a half-inch beard is hard to take seriously.”238
Moreover, the Court could not take seriously that this or other justifications
of prison security passed the least restrictive means analysis noting, among
other things, that numerous other prisons successfully use other methods in
order to accommodate the same religious requests.239
This time, the Court’s application of the statutory compelling interest
test was unanimous.240
3. The States
As a result of the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, states have
wide latitude in whether or not to protect free exercise of religion. Under
the Court’s decision in Smith, states may disregard any burden imposed on
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, as long as their laws are
“otherwise valid.”241 So unless a state law or action is invalid for some
other reason—e.g., it violates freedom of speech242 or invidiously discrimi-
nates on the basis of religion243—the interference with free exercise is con-
stitutionally irrelevant.
Additionally, under the Court’s decision in City of Boerne, the at-
tempted restoration of the compelling interest test in RFRA to safeguard
free exercise of religion does not apply to the states at all.244 And even with
the corrective enactment of RLUIPA, that stringent statutory protection of
free exercise is applicable to the states in only two narrow categories—i.e.,
the use of land and the treatment of prisoners.245 Otherwise, Smith’s narrow
reading of First Amendment religious freedom applies.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 864–867 (citing and applying the same analysis as in Hobby Lobby).
240. There were two separate concurring opinions, but they did not take issue with the Court’s
analysis. Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The
next year, in a follow-up contraceptive mandate case, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016),
several nonprofit organizations claimed entitlement under RFRA to a religious exemption from
even submitting the required notice to the insurer or to the federal government that they chose not
to provide contraceptive coverage. In a unanimous per curiam decision, the Court relied on the
supplemental briefs of both sides to the controversy which acknowledged that there were feasible
options for accommodating the competing interests. Accordingly, the Court remanded the several
cases involved back to the circuit courts to afford the parties “an opportunity to arrive at an
approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time
ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage,
including contraceptive coverage.’” Id. at 1560 (quoting from the government’s supplemental
brief).
241. See supra notes 109–134 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 181–192 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text. Such discriminatory laws are not “neu-
tral” and “generally applicable” within the meaning of those terms as used in Smith. See discus-
sion of Lukumi Babalu, supra notes 194–199 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 156–161 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 161, 233–240 and accompanying text.
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Not surprisingly, with federal constitutional and statutory law impos-
ing very few limits on the states’ interference with free exercise, the treat-
ment of religious liberty nationwide is in disarray. This fundamental First
Amendment right, previously treated as a “preferred freedom” that is essen-
tial to the American “scheme of ordered liberty,”246 is now treated differ-
ently—rigorously protected or hardly at all—depending upon the different
states’ different decisions.
Other fundamental rights—whether free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly, parental rights, or others—are all safeguarded under federal con-
stitutional law to the highest extent. Interference with any of those rights
triggers strict scrutiny, requiring the state to justify its law or action as be-
ing needed to achieve some compelling government interest.247 But not so
for free exercise of religion.
Other than the two narrow areas statutorily protected by RLUIPA, a
state is free under federal law to burden free exercise of religion as long as
whatever it is doing is not otherwise invalid. The result is that while some
states have chosen to continue protecting religious liberty as a fundamental
right, others have chosen to treat it as little more than a nuisance.
In Smith, Justice Scalia condemned the compelling interest test for free
exercise as “courting anarchy.”248 In fact, the Court’s decision to eliminate
that protection for free exercise has resulted in a kind of “anarchy” that
would not be permissible for any other fundamental constitutional right. A
few illustrations will make the point.
In State v. Hershberger,249 decided the same year as Smith, Minne-
sota’s high court rejected the Supreme Court’s decision and, as a matter of
its own state constitutional law, adhered to the more protective standards
that the Supreme Court had just abandoned.250 In that case, members of the
246. See supra notes 55–108 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 144–149 and accompanying text. As Justice Jackson wrote for the Court
long ago in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943),
“[F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship . . . are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.”
Well, since Smith II, that remains true today except for freedom of worship.
248. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
249. 462 N.W.2d 393 (1990), on remand from 485 U.S. 901 (1990).
250. Id. at 398. Of course it is a truism that under our federal system of government a state and
its courts may afford greater protection, under the state’s own law, for rights and liberties than that
which is mandated by the Supreme Court, as a matter of federal law. Indeed, a state and its courts
may decide to protect rights and liberties however they choose as long as they do not actually
violate federal law—e.g., infringe upon a federal constitutional right or liberty—in doing so. See
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (avoiding the federal issue
because “a state court is entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this
Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor
of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee”) (citations omitted);
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (affirming the state court’s decision on
the ground that Supreme Court rulings do not “limit the authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
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Old Order Amish objected on sincere religious grounds to the state require-
ment that they display a fluorescent orange-red triangular sign on their slow
moving vehicles.251 In its initial decision prior to Smith, the state’s high
court applied the federal constitutional standards then in effect and, accord-
ingly, ordered the state to allow the Amish to use a less restrictive alterna-
tive that would still achieve the state’s safety purposes.252
When the Supreme Court vacated that decision in light of the diluted
standard just adopted in Smith, the state court chose to adhere to its prior
decision on the basis of its own constitutional guarantee of religious lib-
erty.253 Applying the same heightened scrutiny that would be triggered by
infringements on other fundamental rights, Minnesota’s Supreme Court ex-
plained that to “infringe upon religious freedoms which this state has tradi-
tionally revered, the state must demonstrate that public safety cannot be
achieved through reasonable alternative means.”254 Because the state had
failed to show that the “use of white reflective tape and a lighted red lan-
tern” was inadequate to serve its highway safety interests, the state’s high
court ruled for the religious objectors.255
Several years later, in State v. Miller,256 a case involving the same
religious objections, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also rejected Smith, and
ruled that “guarantees of our state constitution will best be furthered
through continued use of the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative
analysis of free conscience claims.”257 Applying that analysis, the state’s
high court mandated the accommodation for the religious objectors just as
the Minnesota court had in Hershberger.258
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution”). See generally William J. Brennan, supra note
172; Vincent Martin Bonventre, Changing Roles: The Supreme Court and the State High Courts
in Safeguarding Rights, 70 ALB. L. REV. 841, 842 (2007); Vincent Martin Bonventre, Beyond the
Reemergence—‘Inverse Incorporation’ and Other Prospects for State Constitutional Law, 53
ALB. L. REV. 403 (1989). See also supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text.
251. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), vacated (1990) 495 U.S. 901
(1990), remanded to 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
252. Id. at 289.
253. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399 (1990), on remand from 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
254. Id.
255. Id. In another case where a state court’s pre-Smith decision was vacated by the Supreme
Court, First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), cert.
granted, vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), remanded to 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992), the Washington
Supreme Court similarly adhered to its initial decision as a matter of its own state constitutional
guarantee of freedom of conscience. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 185–186 (1992). Although the state court found that applying Smith II would not necessarily
lead to a different result, it chose instead to decide the case under the compelling interest test from
its own case law and, in doing so, it held that applying the local landmarks preservation law in
disregard of the church’s religious needs “is not necessary to prevent a grave danger to the public
health, peace, or welfare.” Id. at 188.
256. 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
257. Id. at 241.
258. Id. at 242.
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Under Smith, however, an “otherwise valid” traffic law would defeat
sincere religious objections. And when state courts decline to adopt a more
protective standard under their own law and, instead, choose simply to
march lockstep with that Supreme Court decision, free exercise claims are
dismissed. That is exactly what happened in Gingerich v.
Commonwealth.259
Despite a readily available alternative that would have served the
state’s interests and avoided burdening religious liberty—as the courts in
Hershberger and Miller had found—Kentucky’s Supreme Court simply de-
cided that it “will follow federal precedent” and forego any independently
protective state standard.260 That state’s high court thus abandoned the
compelling interest test, just as the Supreme Court had done, and it held that
the traffic law would be “presumed constitutional unless there is no rational
basis for it.”261 So mere rationality would henceforth defeat genuine claims
of free exercise in that state.
It would seem that a fundamental right—if that’s what free exercise of
religion is—would at least require that government make some effort to
accommodate its exercise. A fortiori when an accommodation to protect
that right is so obvious and available. But the Kentucky court in Gingerich,
like the Supreme Court in Smith, chose to treat religious liberty more like a
nuisance to be casually disregarded than a right to be taken seriously. As
the dissenter in Gingerich recognized, “[e]mploying a rational basis stan-
dard renders inconsequential Kentucky’s free exercise guarantee in that vir-
tually any asserted governmental interest could justify laws of general
applicability that have the effect of substantially burdening individuals’ re-
ligious liberty.”262
This same disparate treatment of religious liberty has arisen in numer-
ous other contexts since Smith. Not surprisingly, employment is among
them. In Humphrey v. Lane,263 a state correctional employee who wore his
hair long as a sincere practitioner of Native American Spirituality was or-
dered to cut his hair in accordance with the official grooming policy or he
would be fired.264 The trial court, applying the compelling interest test,
granted the employee injunctive relief; but the intermediate appellate court
applied Smith, rejected the free exercise claim, and reversed.265
259. 382 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Ky. 2012).
260. Id. at 844.
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 847 (Scott, J., dissenting).
263. 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
264. Id. at 1041. The prefatory statement of the case in an Ohio Supreme Court opinion is an
official “Syllabus by the Court,” Id. at 1040.
265. Id. at 1042–1043.
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The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected Smith as the standard for
the state’s own religious freedom guarantee. Instead, the state’s high court
declared:
We adhere to the standard long held in Ohio regarding free exer-
cise claims—that the state enactment must serve a compelling
state interest and must be the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. That protection applies to direct and indirect en-
croachments upon religious freedom.266
Applying that heightened scrutiny as a matter of independent state
constitutional law, the court acknowledged a strong interest in uniformity
and professionalism among the prison guards, but it insisted upon the “sim-
ple accommodation of allowing [the employee] to wear his hair pinned
under his uniform cap” which would satisfy the need for guards to present a
“professional and dignified image.”267
Another state court adopted the much less protective approach to free
exercise. In Hagy v. Commissioner,268 an employee objected, on religious
grounds, to newly assigned duties involving advertisements that “promoted
witchcraft, satanic worship, drugs, homosexuality, and violence.”269 When
the employer refused to accommodate his religious objections, the em-
ployee quit and the state’s labor department approved his application for
unemployment benefits on the ground that his religious objections were a
“good work-related cause to quit.”270 That determination in his favor, how-
ever, was overruled and, ultimately, the state’s intermediate appellate court
ruled against him as well.271
The Tennessee court, favorably citing Smith, announced its own simi-
lar rule: “the enforcement of a ‘facially neutral and uniformly applicable’
law which incidentally burdens a religious practice is valid.”272 Finding that
the state’s unemployment compensation law fit that description, the court
concluded that there was “no merit in plaintiff’s argument regarding consti-
tutional violations.”273 None? Not even a close or difficult balance between
a fundamental constitution right and mere legislation? Well no—not if that
right is treated as a mere nuisance, which current First Amendment juris-
prudence permits.274
266. Id. at 1045.
267. Id. at 1046.
268. No. E2003-01685-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1170031 (Tenn. Ct. App., May 26, 2004). The
opinion notes that “Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court, Nov. 29,
2004.” Id.
269. Id. at 1.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 4.
272. Id.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Tennessee subsequently adopted its own version of the federal RFRA. The state’s Preser-
vation of Religious Freedom Act was signed into law in 2009. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–1–407(b).
Like the federal law, it reinstates the compelling interest test for burdens on free exercise and
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While religious freedom may readily be accommodated in some con-
texts—which, however, does not necessarily mean that the accommodation
will be ordered—there are some contexts in which the competing interest
makes an accommodation or exemption much more complicated. Housing
discrimination is one such context. With Smith mandating very little federal
constitutional protection for free exercise, state courts have resolved the
resulting issues quite differently.
In State v. French,275 the Minnesota Supreme Court—several months
prior to its final Hershberger decision276—granted an exemption from the
state’s Human Rights Act to a landlord who refused to rent to an unmarried
opposite-sex couple.277 The law prohibited discrimination based on marital
status, but the landlord had sincere religious objections to an adult couple
living together in a sexual relationship outside of marriage.278 Applying the
state’s independent constitutional protection of religious freedom, Minne-
sota’s high court required the government to demonstrate a sufficiently
compelling interest to outweigh the landlord’s right to exercise his
religion.279
The state argued that it had an overriding interest in “eliminating per-
nicious discrimination.”280 But finding nothing particularly “pernicious”
about “refusing to treat unmarried, cohabiting couples as if they were le-
gally married,” the court ruled that the state had failed to demonstrate an
interest sufficient to defeat the religious rights of the landlord.281
The Alaska Supreme Court, confronting a similar religious objection
and applying a similar standard under its own constitution, nevertheless
reached the opposite result.282 In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com-
mission, the landlord had refused on religious grounds to rent to several
unmarried opposite-sex couples.283 The landlord’s religious beliefs were
that “even a non-sexual living arrangement by roommates of the opposite
sex is immoral and sinful.”284 The state’s high court agreed with the admin-
istrative determination that the landlord’s refusal to rent violated state and
effectively overrules decisions of its own courts such as in Hagy. At the time of this writing,
twenty-one states have adopted similar legislation rejecting Smith’s dilution of free exercise pro-
tection. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,
NCSL (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-
statutes.aspx#RFRA.
275. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
276. See supra notes 249–255 and accompanying text.
277. French, 460 N.W.2d at 11.
278. Id. at 3–4.
279. Id. at 10. The court viewed the Minnesota constitution as providing “far more protection
of religious freedom” than the United States Constitution. Id. at 9.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 11.
282. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
283. Id. at 276–277.
284. Id. at 277.
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local laws prohibiting marital status discrimination, and it also agreed that
enforcement of those laws against him did not violate his religious
freedom.285
Adhering to the heightened scrutiny of Sherbert and Yoder as a matter
of state constitutional law,286 the Alaska court outlined the test as whether a
government “interest of the highest order” would “suffer if a [religious]
exemption is granted.”287 Applying that test, the court found that the inter-
est in eliminating housing discrimination “that degrades individuals, af-
fronts human dignity, and limits one’s opportunities” would necessarily
“suffer” if exemptions were permitted.288
That different courts might reach different results in cases involving
competing interests that are both strong is not a surprise. Nor is it a surprise
that such a case becomes much easier to resolve when one of the competing
interests is treated like a nuisance and downgraded. That is what the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did with religious liberty in Smith v. Fair Employ-
ment & Housing Commission.289 In that case, California’s high court raised
the possibility that free exercise would be more protected under the state’s
constitutional law than under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fed-
eral Constitution.290 But as the dissenting opinion complained, the state
court’s treatment of religious freedom was, instead, “virtually indistinguish-
able from the rationale and holding of Smith.”291
Similar to the Minnesota and Alaska cases, this California case in-
volved a landlord who refused on religious grounds to rent to unmarried
couples because she believed “it is a sin for her to rent her units to people
who will engage in nonmarital sex.”292 Upholding the administrative deter-
mination that the landlord’s religious objections did not excuse her viola-
tion of the state’s prohibition against marital status discrimination in
housing, the court analyzed the case under both Smith and the compelling
interest test that decision had abandoned. Under the former, the California
court simply recited that the law was “generally applicable and neutral to-
wards religion” and, therefore, that the landlord was bound to comply with
it.293
285. Id. at 278, 285.
286. Id. at 281–282.
287. Id. at 282.
288. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283.
289. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)
290. Id. at 930–931.
291. Id. at 966 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 913.
293. Id. at 919.
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Then, ostensibly applying the compelling interest test,294 the court dis-
missed the free exercise claim by denying that the law imposed any sub-
stantial burden on the religiously objecting landlord. The court summarized
its analysis this way:
[The landlord’s] religion does not require her to rent apartments,
nor is investment in rental units the only available income-pro-
ducing use of her capital. Thus, she can avoid the burden on her
religious exercise without violating her beliefs or threatening her
livelihood. The asserted burden is the result not of a law directed
against religious exercise, but of a religion-neutral law that hap-
pens to operate in a way that makes Smith’s religious exercise
more expensive.295
It is, apparently, not the duty of government to avoid burdens on free
exercise of religion. Rather, according to the California court in this case,
that duty falls upon the religious practitioner—even if that means having to
give up one’s chosen livelihood. No accommodations or exemptions need
be afforded to insure that religious liberty be safeguarded. As long as relig-
ion itself is not the target of discriminatory treatment, free exercise may
simply be disregarded as a nuisance.
Finally, the decision of New York’s highest court in Catholic Charities
v. Serio deserves some attention.296 If free exercise of religion jurispru-
dence after Smith is a hodgepodge of incoherence, inconsistency, and con-
tradictions across the states—with varying tests and interpretations and
protections (or lack thereof) for what is supposed to be a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution—the New York decision is a micro-
cosm of it all. The court’s denial of a religious exemption from the state’s
contraceptive insurance mandate297—agree with it or not—is one of the
few understandable aspects of the decision. What free exercise law actually
294. The court did so believing at the time—prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Boerne—that the federal RFRA and, thus, the heightened scrutiny under Sherbert and Yoder ap-
plied to state cases. Id. at 922–923.
295. Smith v. Fair Emp’t, 913 P.26 at 928–929 (citations omitted). Albeit using a different
rationale, the Florida Supreme Court in Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023 (Fla.
2004), also diluted the compelling interest test it was ostensibly applying. Interpreting the state’s
own RFRA—which, like the federal counterpart, reinstated the heightened scrutiny of Sherbert
and Yoder—the court held that a “substantial burden” on free exercise only covers “conduct that
his religion forbids or . . . conduct that his religion requires,” but not “religiously motivated
conduct.” Id. at 1033. Apparently, conduct based on mere religious beliefs does not count, only
religiously obligated or prohibited conduct.
296. 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006). Disclosure: I consulted with the attorney for Catholic Char-
ities in this case. Although I am not a religious believer and do support the contraceptive mandate,
I support religious liberty and the requested religious exemptions even more fervently. Moreover,
though I do believe that a court could reasonably decide that granting the exemptions would
undermine the important purposes of the law, I think the court’s analysis and the rule it adopted
for dealing with burdens on religious freedom is—to be blunt—dreadfully unprotective of that
fundamental right.
297. Id. at 461, 468.
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is in New York after this case is, at best, perplexing. On the one hand, the
New York court claimed that, as a matter of independent state constitutional
law, it was rejecting the “inflexible rule” of Smith that neutral and generally
applicable laws defeat free exercise claims.298 But within a few paragraphs,
the court largely backtracked. The court announced that “the principle
stated by the United States Supreme Court in Smith—that citizens are not
excused by the Free Exercise Clause from complying with generally appli-
cable and neutral laws, even ones offensive to their religious tenets—should
be the usual, though not the invariable, rule.299
Reviewing its previous decisions, the court failed to acknowledge its
early landmark, People v. Barber,300 where the court applied the state con-
stitution to carve out a religious exemption from an otherwise valid gener-
ally applicable law, even though the Supreme Court had just declined to do
so.301 Instead, the court characterized the cited precedents as creating some
as yet undefined balancing test between the competing religious and gov-
ernment interests.302 It then proceeded to formulate a balancing test that
relieved the government of any requirement to justify the burden placed on
religious liberty.303 The rule fashioned by the court was that the religious
objector “bears the burden of showing that the challenged legislation, as
applied to that party, is an unreasonable interference with religious
freedom.”304
Lest there be any doubt that it was placing the burden on the party
whose fundamental right was being interfered with, rather than the govern-
ment which was interfering with that right, the court repeated itself. It in-
sisted that “[t]he burden of showing that an interference with religious
practice is unreasonable, and therefore requires an exemption from the stat-
ute, must be on the person claiming the exemption.”305 Although the burden
of justification is on the government, under the strict scrutiny test, whenever
it interferes with other fundamental rights306—and for free exercise as well
under RFRA and other states’ constitutional law307—the New York Court
of Appeals simply referred to “legislative prerogative” and “efficient gov-
ernment” as the supposed reasons to treat religious liberty differently.308
Then, to add some mystery and apparent second-thoughts to its
adopted rule, the court identified some burdens on religious liberty that,
298. Id. at 466.
299. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
300. 46 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1943).
301. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
302. Catholic Charities v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 466 (N.Y. 2006).
303. Id. (holding that “substantial deference is due the Legislature.”)
304. Id.
305. Id. at 467.
306. See supra notes 144, 247 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 217–240, 249–259 and accompanying text.
308. Catholic Charities, 859 N.E.2d at 467.
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regardless of what it had just outlined, it would not tolerate. These included
“a requirement that all witnesses must testify” without an exemption for
priest-penitent confidences, “a general prohibition of alcohol consumption”
without an exemption for Christian communion, and a “uniform regulation
of meat preparation” without an exemption for kosher slaughtering.309 The
court declared “these hypothetical laws to be well beyond the bounds of
constitutional acceptability.”310
Does that mean that the application of such laws to the religious prac-
tice would be per se invalid? And that the religious objector would not bear
the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness to obtain an exemption?
Even though none of those neutral and generally applicable laws would
themselves be unreasonable?311
So is the real test a matter of how important the burdened belief or
practice is to the religion?312 Does that test then entail courts engaged in
examining a religion and assessing how important that belief or practice is?
And does that in turn also entail courts deciding that some religious beliefs
and practices are not that important?313
Beyond that, with those enumerated and similar exceptions in mind,
what exactly is the free exercise jurisprudence that New York’s high court
adopted in Catholic Charities? To what extent is that right protected? As a
fundamental liberty? Or as a nuisance usually to be dismissed as not quite
so important, as it was in that case?
As the cases discussed show, that is precisely the disparity with which
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom is being treated across the
country since the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith permitted that to be so.
IV. CONCLUSION: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR NUISANCE
The Supreme Court majority in Smith, speaking through Justice Scalia,
repudiated the compelling interest test for free exercise of religion as “con-
309. Id. (quoting Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1418–1419 (1990)).
310. Id.
311. In all candor, the recitation of these hypotheticals as “well beyond the bounds of constitu-
tional acceptability” seems so at odds with the thrust of the court’s opinion that it seems an
addition by or at the urging of someone other than the primary author of the opinion. A unanimous
opinion—as this was—is oftentimes more compromise than conviction, and often the product of
additions and deletions at the behest of others who have joined it. See Vincent Martin Bonventre,
New York’s Chief Judge Kaye: Her Separate Opinions Bode Well for Renewed State Constitution-
alism at the New York Court of Appeals, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 1163, 1167 nn.18–19 (1994).
312. What does the court’s rule mean for an abortion coverage mandate? That question is now
in litigation. See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Vullo, No. 7536–17, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 5,
2017).
313. Of critical note is that any such “intrusive inquiry into religious belief” would likely run
afoul of both the non-establishment and free exercise guarantees of the First Amendment. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987). See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 716 (1981).
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tradict[ing] common sense” and as “courting anarchy.”314 But, in fact, the
consequences wrought by that decision are what makes little sense and what
has created a veritable anarchy. A fundamental, First Amendment, constitu-
tional right was stripped of the protection of heightened judicial scrutiny315
which safeguards every other First Amendment right and, indeed, every
other fundamental liberty.316
As a result of Smith, free exercise of religion has been afforded vary-
ing levels of protection, from a great deal to nearly none at all, depending
upon the varying decisions of the various states.317 Except where a violation
of some other fundamental right incidentally interferes with free exer-
cise,318 or where a religion is the intended victim of invidious discrimina-
tion,319 the states have been left with virtually free reign to treat religious
liberty as a fundamental right or as little more than a mere nuisance.
Hence, some state supreme courts have rejected Smith and retained the
compelling interest protection spelled out in Sherbert and Yoder as a matter
of their own constitutional law.320 Others have chosen to march lockstep
with the Supreme Court and have simply adopted the federal constitutional
decision in Smith as their own state constitutional rule.321 Then there are
those state courts which have claimed to be applying the compelling interest
test but, in fact, applied a much diluted version of it and denied that there
had been a cognizable burden on free exercise—either under the state’s
constitution322 or under the state’s RFRA.323 And there is at least one state
high court that 1) explicitly rejected Smith as a matter of state constitutional
law but, 2) in the same opinion, also rejected the compelling interest test
and 3) announced that the Smith rule would usually apply and, 4) if that
were not confusing enough, spelled out its own extremely unprotective rule,
but 5) then identified exceptions that seemed to contradict or at least seri-
ously undermine the rule just announced.324
314. Emp’t Div. v. Smith (Smith II), 494 U.S. 872, 885, 888 (1990).
315. See supra notes 109–134 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 144, 247 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 241–313 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 181–192 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text. There is also the statutory protection
under RLUIPA that restricts state interference with religious liberty in land use and prison matters.
See supra notes 233–240 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990), on remand from 495
U.S. 901 (1990); see also supra notes 249–258 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Ky. 2012); see also supra
notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); see also
supra notes 289–295 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2004); see also supra note
295.
324. See Catholic Charities v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006); see also supra notes
296–313 and accompanying text. Again, see disclosure at supra note 296.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-3\UST306.txt unknown Seq: 42 14-SEP-18 9:02
2018] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR NUISANCE 691
Smith’s supposed rescuing free exercise jurisprudence from “anarchy”
in the name of “common sense” has thus generated enormous disarray and
confusion and has left that First Amendment right at the mercy of a vast
disparity of treatments. A case currently pending at the Supreme Court
demonstrates much of what has been discussed in these pages and provides
a fitting illustration with which to conclude.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion,325 the owners of a bakery in Colorado refused, on sincere religious
grounds, to create a cake sought by a same-sex couple to celebrate their
upcoming wedding.326 The state found the bakery’s refusal to be a violation
of its law that prohibits sexual-orientation discrimination in places of busi-
ness327 and, on appeal, the state’s intermediate court agreed.328 The state’s
supreme court declined to review the case,329 but the United States Supreme
Court chose to do so.330
In its decision, the Colorado appellate court addressed the bakery own-
ers’ religious objections after first rejecting their free speech arguments.331
The court held that, because Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute was a
“neutral law of general applicability, it defeated the free exercise claim as a
matter of federal constitutional law under Smith.332 The court then rejected
the argument for greater protection under the state constitution and, instead,
held that Smith was the standard for Colorado’s law.333 In accord with that
decision, the Colorado court applied a “rational basis” test to summarily
dismiss the religious objections as a matter of state constitutional law as
well.334
At the United States Supreme Court, the bakery owners’ brief relies
largely on free speech, claiming that creating a cake for the same-sex
couple would be expressive activity endorsing that couple’s marriage.335 In
that brief, there are also two arguments ostensibly based on the “Free Exer-
cise Clause.” The first such argument is in fact about “discriminatory appli-
cation” and “discriminatory reading” of the state law, allegedly resulting in
325. 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017).
326. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–277 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015),
cert. granted sub. nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017).
On June 4, 2018, while publication of this article was pending the Supreme Court rendered its
decision. See infra note 343.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 294.
329. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 15SC738, 2016
WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016) (denying certiorari).
330. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. 2290. The decision was pending at the time of this
writing.
331. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 288.
332. Id. at 292.
333. Id. at 292–294.
334. Id.
335. See Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137
S.Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16–111), 2017 WL 3913762, at *16–37.
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“discriminatory treatment” of the bakers.336 It is entirely in the nature of an
invidious discrimination claim.337 The other ostensibly “Free Exercise
Clause” argument, which discusses so-called “hybrid rights,” is nothing
more than a very brief restatement that the bakers’ have a “strong free-
speech interest” in their religion claim.338 It is essentially their free speech
argument under a different heading.
To underscore that latter point. The amicus brief filed by the United
States339 does not even make a free exercise of religion argument.340 In-
stead, it rests its support for the bakers solely on free speech.341 Whether
the bakers should prevail in this case, or whether eliminating sexual-orien-
tation discrimination in the market place is more important, it is extraordi-
narily significant that an undeniable burden imposed on First Amendment
freedom of religion, in and of itself—i.e., as opposed to the bakers’ free
speech or the alleged deliberate discrimination against them—has become
such a comparably insignificant aspect of this litigation. That fundamental
right is being treated as little more than a nuisance unless tied to some other
constitutional concern.342
But that is the current state of free exercise under the Constitution and
the legacy of Smith.343
336. Id. at *38–46.
337. For a related discussion, see supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text.
338. Id. at *46–48.
339. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16–111), 2017 WL
4004530 (filed by the Department of Justice under the administration of President Donald Trump).
340. Id. at *33 n.6.
341. The sole argument is based on “The First Amendment Free Speech Clause.” Id. at *9.
342. Disclosure: Despite my fervent support for religious liberty, I strongly favor the elimina-
tion of sexual-orientation discrimination and believe that the Supreme Court should view eliminat-
ing that evil as an interest of the very highest order, just as it did with regard to racial
discrimination in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See supra notes
92–108 and accompanying text. So I would not favor granting an exemption to the bakers.
343. On June 4, 2018, while publication of this article was pending, the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018). The 7-2 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, narrowly held that Colo-
rado’s Civil Rights Commission was hostile to the baker’s religious beliefs and thus did not give
him a fair and neutral hearing. The Court avoided the underlying issue of whether a religious
objector would be entitled to an exemption from an otherwise valid, generally applicable anti-
discrimination law. Instead, the Court relied on its precedents, such as Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Ave. Inc. v. City of Hialeah which ruled in favor of religious objectors solely on the
ground that the legislation was the product of hostility toward a particular religion. See discussion
supra note 179. In short, the Court found that the Colorado determination that the baker was not
entitled to an exemption was not “otherwise valid,” because it unlawfully assessed the baker’s
religious belief as illegitimate and subjected it to ridicule. In the Supreme Court’s own words, the
Colorado commission “disparage[d]” the baker’s religious faith “by describing it as despicable,
and also characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.” Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. Oregon v. Smith as the current standard for protecting—or
not—religious liberty was left untouched. See The Cakeshop case: What the Court Did NOT
Decide, http://www.newyorkcourtwatcher.com/2018/06/the-cakeshop-case-what-court-did-not
.html.
